v-^/.^^>*' v^^N'^* %/-^.<^V ^ 







• # ■« 



t • ©. 



V'^^^v'^ 



' *»o 



t. ' * 



<0^ ••v^^ r>. <> f»*«* ^ ^^ .•.Law* V'^ 



^>* *^ 







.♦^^♦. 






* .^0• 



^* :^^', %..<,^ :MSc, %/ /^v %, 









IP-^^J 



' <^ 









*0^ •••^'. 



• NO 






^°-^*. . 



• V r '^' 








^o 















^°-^^. . 












^'^ 

^.•.l::^'* 












'a/ 







t •©. 















o_ *• 



LM'-. ^> 




NOW IS THE TIME 






TO 



JS3E!«X-«X-X^1ES X-X". 



SUGGESTIONS ON THE FUESENT CRISIS. 




BY CHARLES ASTOR BRISTED. /n^ 




NOW IS THE TIME 



TO 



SUGGESTIONS ON THE PRESENT CRISIS. 



BY CHARLES ASTOR BRISTED. 



t * «>» » 



MARTIN B. BROWN, BOOK AND JOB PRI NTER. 
18 6 2. 

L 



PREFACE. 

[The author of this pamphlet has never had or attempted to 
have auy practical experience of public life. But he has long been 
a political student and has examined American politics from abroad, 
as well as at home. As he has no axe to grind for himself or for 
others, his absence of interested bias may possibly be a setoff to 
the greater political knowledge of men better known. 

The correctness of his former anticipations also gives him con- 
fidence. Since arriving at man's estate he has never toadied or 
yielded to a Southerner. He has never ceased to warn those of 
his countrymen whom his feeble voice and influence could reach, 
against the danger as well as wickedness of giving up every thing 
to those aggressive semi-barbarians who have now torn the 
country asunder. In reference to the present crisis, he predicted 
almost at the very beginning of our troubles (in January, 1861), 
a bloody and long war. Being in England that Spring he steadily 
re-asserted his opinion, though unable to find a single person 
agreeing with him. Neither the enemy's successes in the follow- 
ing summer, nor ours last winter even made him deviate from i 
or from the other opinion which he formed and expressed at the 
first outbreak, that the war would be waged chiefly in the Border 
States and must ultimately become in intention what it was in 
reality, a war for the possession of those States. 

These considerations embolden him to put forth his views in 
print. They may be unpopular — but he never sought popularity 
when a young and ambitious man with life and hope before him, 
and under his present circumstances he regards it as less than 
nothing. They may be misconstrued; he may even be suspected 
of wishing to aid the enemy — but he has lived long enough to 
learn that any man of strong convictions who expresses them 
boldly, must be prepared to have his motives misinterpreted. On 
one sole point does he desire to guard against the possibility of 
misconception. These suggestions have been written and pub- 
lished without his consulting any person ivhaiever. He, therefore, 
hopes that no attempt will be made to consider any man but him- 
self — still less any party or set of men, I'eposnsible for them.] 



NOW IS THE TIME TO SETTLE IT. 



There is a lull in the war. Though our would- 
be invaders have escaped, through our usual want 
of promptness, the punishment which their audacity 
deserved, yet no foot of these sanguinary vaga- 
bonds has polluted the free soil of Pennsylvania. 
On the other hand, our armies are as far off as 
ever from Richmond, the Sebastdpol of this con- p 
test. While both sides are pausing to recruit 
after the late desperate battles, it seems a fitting 
moment to inquire if nothing can be done to ter- 
minate the fearful struggle, or at least to reduce 
it within reasonable dimensions, and give it a rea- 
sonable prospect of definite issue. 

I propose that we acknowledge the independ- 
ence of the ten so-called Confederate States, on 
condition of their surrendering to us those por- 
tions of Virginia still in their possession, and all 
claim to the rest of the five Border States, and 
giving us material guarantees for the free naviga- 
tion of the Mississippi and the Mexican Gulf. 

Not that I doubt our ability to conquer the se- 
ceders. Had we made war from the first in 
earnest — had we treated the enemy as an enemy, 
we might by this time have subjugated, or, if need , 
were, exterminated him. Even now it is not too 
late. We might go on, losing man for man, till 



6 



our opponents were swept off the earth, and we 
should still remain a great people, and might re- 
people their country. 

Nor would any considerations of humanity pro- 
perly intervene to stay such a proceeding. Could 
the whole white population of the South be cut off 
to-morrow, it would be exactly what nine-tenths 
of them deserve. Their conspiracy is the most 
wicked and unprovoked recorded in history. It is 
a crime not only against their own government, 
but against liberty, human progress and the world; 
and no earthly punishment that could befal them, 
would be too great. 

Neither should we be deterred from extreme 
measures by any thought of what England or 
France might say. Their animosity is such that, 
were we inspired to behave like angels of light, we 
should be depicted by them as in the blackness of 
darkness. Whatever we have done, whatever 
we can possibly do, is sure to be villified and 
misrepresented by walking vinegar-cruets, like 
Roebuck, antediluvian asses like Beresford Hope, 
and all the miscellaneous lackeys of the French 
emperor, to whom an honest man would be doing 
too much honor by remembering their names. All 
that they can or may utter, should " pass by us as 
the idle wind." 

But it is very clear that we — that is, our 
Government, and the majority of us — are not pre- 
pared to take this extreme course, and it is very 
doubtful if anything short of a foreign invasion 
would ever drive us to it. A feeling, strangely 
compounded of good and bad motives, of the long- 
animity of some and the cowardice of others, of 
unwillingness to shed the blood of the guilty 



white, and indifference to the wrongs of the inno- 
cent negro, of regard for the sacredness of prop- 
erty, and reluctance to accept our full responsi- 
bilities, has tied our hands and clogged our feet at 
every step. The Government has evidently no 
disposition to go " thorough," for every general 
who gave symptoms of making real war, has been 
effectually shelved. Those of us who would carry 
on the conflict for the restoration of the'^Union, in 
the only way that can possibly secure its success, 
are, and are likely to remain, a minority. There- 
fore, we had better let the seceders go, and get 
rid of them, if we can, once for all. 

[Just as the above was written, came the news 
of the President's proclamation, " abolishing sla- 
very," as the newspaper-headings say. This 
seems, at first sight, to change the whole aspect of 
affairs ; but, on second thought, its effect prom- 
ises to be more apparent than real. However 
honorable to its author, I fear that, for want of 
the men to carry it out, it will prove but a hrutum 
fulmen, and only add another to the many threats 
which we have uttered without executing, not so 
much from inability, as from want of fixed deter- 
mination. I fear, too, that like most of our mili- 
tary movements, it is well meant, but a little late.] 

For as to the prevalent idea that we are to sub- 
jugate them, without destroying or confiscating 
their property, without freeing their slaves, with- 
out hurting them more than is absolutely necessary, 
and then to hold them in subjection, I consider it 
an insane and impossible dream. 

Let us look a moment at the composition of so- 
ciety in the ten Southern States. There are, first 
of all, the leaders in the movement, prominent poli- 



ticians and large slaveholders, probably 200,000 
in number. This oligarchical class must, of course, 
be exterminated or driven into exile. They have 
staked their all on the rebellion, and cannot sub- 
mit. 

Then come the masses — about 4,000,000 of 
" mean whites" — some of them small slaveholders, 
but the majority non-slaveholders. This class is 
known to be in the lowest stage of civilization, 
but one remove above barbarism. Enterprising 
tourists, like Olmstead, who have penetrated into 
the interior of the country, bring back startling 
reports of their ignorance, filth and general bru- 
tality. They would soon have become formidable 
to the wealthy class, had not the latter adroitly 
averted their envy, and directed their hostility 
against the North, by persuading them that a 
panacea for their poverty and wretchedness would 
be found in setting up an empire of their own, 
which should give them unlimited slave trade, and 
the opportunity of buying " niggers " cheap. 
Thus, these people, more ignorant than the Irish 
cotter or the French peasant, and scarcely less 
barbarous than the New-Zealander, possessing, too, 
a considerable amount of personal courage and 
aptitude for the use of arms, have been taught, 
probably for thirty years, certainly for more than 
ten, to hate us — and they do hate us, as the devil 
(according to the old proverb) hates holy water. 
Supposing them once conquered, how are they to 
stay conquered? It is clear that we must hold 
them as the English Protestant holds the Irish 
Papist, as the Frenchman holds the Roman, as the 
Austrian holds the Venetian, as the Russian holds 
the Pole. An army of half a million would not be 



9 



too much for the purpose. Lastly, the blacks. 
Whether these are all freed, or remain divided 
between the conditions of freedom and slavery, 
their relations to our army of occupation and to 
the conquered whites will prove a constant source 
of perplexity. [The idea that above three millions 
of negroes are first to be freed and afterwards 
colonized, I hold simply impracticable. Thrice 
our resources, great as they are, would not suffice 
to accomplish it.] 

Let no one say that the above is an exaggerated 
picture of the anti-Union feeling among the sece- 
ders. Let no one ask incredulously how such a 
state of things could be produced in a few years. 
The anti-Union feeling of the South is not a thing 
of yesterday. The South has never been patriotic 
in the same sense, or to the same extent, as the 
North. The heresy of State Rights, and the nar- 
rowing influences of slavery, caused the Southern- 
ers to regard all questions in a sectional, rather 
than a national light. Such secondary affection 
as they had for the Union, was not from principle, 
but for the advantages they derived from it. They 
acquiesced in it, while they had the absolute con- 
trol or greatly-predominating influence ; as soon 
as this ceased to be the case, they broke it up. 
Secession and civil war are but the legitimate de- 
velopment of those doctrines and practices which 
made the Southerner a Southerner first, and an 
American long, long after. Politicans may not 
have mentioned this, because it was against their 
own petty temporary interests to do so ; the bulk 
of our people may not have observed it, it was so 
contrary to their wishes and feelings ; but men of 
the world, often more sharp-sighted than profes- 



10 



sional politicians, noted it at many times and in 
many places. It was so salient, as even to strike 
men who had a natural aversion to anything like 
political speculation. Washington Irving observed 
more than twenty years ago, when European 
travel was less general than it now is, that while 
the New-Yorker or New-Englander always signed 
hiuiself on hotel-books as from " the United States 
of America," the Virginian or Carolinian merely 
appended the name of his State. It was impossi- 
ble for a person of ordinary reflection to associate 
with the rising generation of educated Southern- 
ers, between 1830 and 1840, and not remark how 
they looked at every point of morals or statesman- 
ship through southern spectacles. And, if this 
was the case with the comparatively respectable 
class, the gentlemen and quasi-gQuilemen of that 
region, how much more must it have been with the 
" mean whites," who, prevented by ignorance from 
taking any independent position, could only copy 
and exaggerate the ideas of their superiors ? The 
Border States, from their necessary contact with 
freedom, could not escape a certain knowledge and 
comprehension of the country's greatness; they 
could not altogether overlook the advantages of 
freedom, as exemplified in the superior wealth and 
intelligence of the North. But the patriotism of 
the Cotton States decreased, as their ignorance and 
seclusion increased. 

[This was written the day before Mr. Hurlbut's 
third letter appeared in the Times. I have not 
altered or added a syllable. Some of the expres- 
sions read almost as if copied literally from his. 
They are, indeed, common places among all men of 
ordinary intelligence who have studied the South- 
erner.] 



11 



No doubt, there was an appreciable amount of 
Union sentiment in all the seceding States, except 
South Carolina ; and our Government was there- 
fore bound to make the restoration of the Union 
the original object of the war ; it would have been 
cowarclly- not to give this feeling a chance. But 
the event proved, what observant men had long 
suspected, that it was a very secondary and feeble 
Union sentiment, utterly unable to make head 
against the supposed claims of State Rights-a 
sentiment which, in comparison to the Union leel- 
ing of the North, was "as moonlight unto sunlight, 
or as water unto wine." , „ . 

We are supposed to have lost by this war, one 
way and another, 200,000 men in less than two 
years. If we made it summary and internecine, 
we might crush and annihilate our enemy m ano- 
ther /ear at the expense of as many additional 
lives. But, by going on as we have been, we shall 
lose the 200,000 more lives, and we shall not 

crush the enemy. „ , r, j 

I propose, therefore, that we offer the Seceders 
peace on these terms : the independence of the ten 
so-called Confederate States to be acknowledged, 
they surrendering to us the whole _oi the five 
Border States, and we, moreover, retaining two or 
more strongholds, as material guarantees lor the 
free navigation of the Mississippi and Mexican 

Gulf 

These are the only terms which we could accept, 
consistently with our honor and safety. T''e ma- 
iority of the inhabitants of four, Border States 
and Western Virginia, have unmistakably andre- 
peatedly declared their preference lor the Union. 
To surrender them, would be the height of coward- 



12 

ice, and a confession that we were conquered ; not 
to mention the vital importance of Washington to 
us, from its prestige as the capital. With respect 
to Virginia proper, it is notorious that the Con- 
federates established their capital at Richmond, for 
the facility of operating thence against Washing- 
ton. It cannot be left there as a standing menace 
to us. Two rival capitals, in such proximity, are 
not to be thought of. Even should we hereafter 
find it convenient to transfer our metropolis else- 
where, that of the Confederates must not remain at 
Richmond. The inhabitants of Southern Virginia 
are, doubtless, averse to our rule. But those of 
Eastern Tennessee are equally so to the rule of the 
Confederates. An exchange between the loyal 
Tennesseans and disloyal Virginians, might be 
effected without any formidable expense, or other 
difficulty. 

The possession of material guarantees for the 
free navigation of the Mississippi and the Gulf is 
absolutely necessary, from the impossibility of 
trusting any promises or treaty stipulations which 
the Confederates might otherwise make. 

The advantages of such a peace would be mani- 
fold, certain and immediate. We might disband, 
at least, 400,000 men of our army. We should 
^ cease to augment our rapidly-accumulating debt— 
^^^y/C/- nay, m»^ entertain reasonable hopes of diminishing 
it. We should certainly have stopped the progress 
of slavery in one direction for ever. We should 
have redeemed from slavery a large and valuable 
tract of country, for the " institution" can be 
eliminated from the Border States in comparatively 
short time, with full compensation to the owners. 
Thus, we should vindicate ourselves before God 



13 



and the world, and gain the good opinion of all 
nations, whose good opinion is worth having — 
which category, it is hardly necessary to add, does 
not include England or France. Starting anew 
with twenty-four free States, and as many millions 
of free population, our national energy and re- 
sources would soon enable us to repair the losses 
of war. Oar credit would soon stand higher than 
ever. The oppressed and destitute of all lands 
would, more than ever, flock to our shores. We 
should go on better than before, because freed 
from our great curse and our great drag-chain. 

And if any one should say that by such an ar- 
rangement the conspirators would get off too 
cheaply, that their success in forming a separate 
government would compensate them for their fail- 
ure first, in retaining control over the whole 
country by intrigue, and afterwards in conquering 
it by a coup d'etat ; I reply, let us have a little 
patience. Let us leave these men to their own 
devices, and we shall see them punished to our 
hearts' content. 

It is not pleasant to be God's executioners. 
When the natural working of His ordained laws 
brings about His vengeance, our satisfaction is- 
more complete. In the desolation wrought upon. 
Virginia by her own inhabitants, and their pro- 
fessed friends, we see the just retribution of her 
wickedness in deliberately and willingly preferring 
evil to good. The apparently accidental conflag- 
ration of Charleston suited us better than if it had 
been caused by our shells. Had Richmond, as 
lately reported, been depopulated by pestilence, we 
should have hailed it as a direct interposition of 
Providence. Were a negro insurrection to break 



14 



out spontaneously anywhere in the South, we 
should regard it with less mingled feelings than 
one directly fomented by ourselves. Let us, then, 
I repeat it, but have a little patience, and we shall 
soon see the new Confederacy an object of pity, 
rather than of hatred or fear. It is founded on 
a suicidal principle, the right of mutual dissolu- 
tion. At present, its members are held together 
by the bond of resistance to us. The outside 
pressure of war once removed, they will begin to 
quarrel among themselves. The mean whites are 
naturally disposed to envy their rulers. Now, as 
for the last fifteen years or more, their common 
hatred of us, holds both classes together ; remove 
our contact, and the masses will speedily grow un- 
easy. Their fear of Abraham Lincoln's imaginary 
despotism once dissipated, they will not tarry to 
realize the actual despotism of Jefferson Davis. 
The bad faith, inherent in all classes, will soon 
embroil them with some of their foreign friends, 
and destroy what little credit they might other- 
wise have. They will find themselves poorer out 
of the Union than they were in it. The partial 
success of their plans, will prove their own most 
deserved punishment. 

So far, so good ; but the prospect is not entirely 
roseate. There are strong objections to be urged 
against this plan, or any plan, of separation. 
These objections let us proceed to consider. 

The first impediment to any offer of terms on 
our part — I put it first, really believing it to be 
at the root of the whole difficulty — is our pride. 
Tiie Union is considered by us to be the cause (as 
it really was the principal cause) of our greatness. 
It has been a name to conjure with. Our devotion 



15 

to it, has been our patriotism and loyalty com- 
bined. A portion of the glory of the Union 
attached to every individual citizen. Any diminu- 
tion of this glory, was every individual citizen's 
personal loss. Then we have been taunted by 
Englishmen, and Frenchmen, and Southerners with 
the dissolution of the Union, till our great wish^ is 
to give their taunts a practical answer, by main- 
taining it in spite of them all. 

Now, the original Union is undoubtedly a great 
thing, but it is not quite the one thing and only 
thing needful. Let us take an extreme case. 
Suppose it could be restored to-morrow, on condi- 
tion that Jefferson Davis was its president, and 
the Breckenridge programme carried out, slavery 
made national, Kansas a slave State, all freedom 
of discussion everywhere suppressed. Who would 
accept the Union on such terms ? A few hundred, 
perhaps a few thousand, miserable wretches might 
be gleaned throughout the country who would do 
so, but surely the great bulk of the nation would 
reject the offer with indignant loathing. 

Devotion to the Union is our loyalty. The 
English are an eminently loyal people, yet they 
did not hesitate to change their dynasty in 1688, 
when their liberties depended on the change. De- 
votion to the Union is our patriotism. The Dutch 
are an eminently patriotic people, yet, wlien in 
danger of being conquered by Louis XIV., they 
resolved, if the alternative could not be avoided, 
to leave their country, rather than yield to the 
tyrant. 

Once admit that there may be something more 
valuable than the old Union, and the charm is 
broken. We can see that we have idolized it — 



16 

that is, have put an exaggerated value on it, as 
men frequently do on really valuable objects. 

No man does wisely in disregarding words and 
names, for they often involve the most important 
things. Still, when the reality can be preserved 
by yielding the semblance, it is the part of a wise 
man to yield the semblance, though it cause a tem- 
porary loss of prestige. 

This line of argument will be more fully and 
naturally developed in treating of the second ob- 
jection. 

Doubtless, to give up the Union in its entireness, 
implies a certain humiliation. But it must be con- 
sidered that we have only a choice of evils, evils, 
too, for which we are not wholly unaccountable. 
The guilt of the conspirators is, indeed, measure- 
less, but our own conduct has not been without re- 
proach. Let us confess frankly, that the coward- 
ice or stupidity, or both, of the Democrats and 
Old-Line Whigs, who, until recently, made up be- 
tween them a large majority of the country, had 
brought us to a pass from which we could not 
escape without humiliation. We have suffered 
humiliations. We suffer them now. England 
bullied us in the Trent affair. France shamelessly 
invades Mexico under our noses. Spain has 
threatened St. Domingo. The very Mormons 
assume airs of superiority towards us. Our na- 
tional stock, which used to be at 16 per cent, 
premium, is now virtually at 16 per cent, discount. 
If we can escape the recurrence of these and simi- 
lar evils, would it not be well to do so, rather 
than struggle against the chance of escaping a 
single humiliation, which we may have to undergo 
after all ? 



17 



As to the taunts of the French and English, I 
have already said, and now repeat it, that we 
ought to treat whatever they say about us with 
utter indifference. It has always been one of our 
greatest national weaknesses, that we are curious 
to see ourselves abused. If no man in the country 
ever read a line extracted from an English paper, 
beyond the actual items of European news, we 
should be all the better for it. Suppose that after 
the five thousand false prophecies which these 
lying scribes have uttered, one of their predictions 
should prove partially true, is that a triumph 
which should grieve or concern us ? Is the pre- 
vention of such a triumph worth the sacrifice of a 
single life, or the expenditure of a single dol- 
lar ? 

Stiil less reason would the Confederates have to 
brag, or we to care for their bragging. If they 
dictated the terms of separation to us, they might, 
indeed, triumph. If, however, we assign the 
terms, they will not " have achieved their inde- 
pendence," but we shall have kicked them out as un- 
worthy oar society, which they doubtless are. 

National pride is not a feeling to be reprehended, 
but it may sometimes take the wrong direction. 
In this respect, it might be well if we could borrow 
a little of our enemy's exuberant self-reliance. 
What, shall 300,000 half-civilized South Caro- 
linians, whom we could put into one of the sub- 
urbs of New-York, set up to constitute a nation, 
and are twenty-four great States, with as many 
million of inhabitants, not able to stand by them- 
selves ? Shall we let our inferiors suppose that 
we cannot do without them ? 

The second objection is, that of internal danger. 



18 



It is imagined that the separatioii of a portion, will 
be equivalent to a dissolution of the whole ; and 
that by consenting to the independence of the 
Confederates, we shall be acknowleda:ino: the rio-ht 
of secession as a principle, and thereby destroying 
the key-stone of our governmental fabric. 

Now, so far from admitting that separation im- 
plies dissolution, I believe that the remaining 

Union would have much stronger cohesive power 
than the original one ; and so does the acute and 
profound historian of the Netherlands, to judge 
from the last paragraph of his pamphlet. We 
have seen that, owing to the prevalence of slavery, 
and the belief in " State Rights," the South has 
never— never for the last forty years, at least — 
been patriotic in the same sense as the North. 
The Southerners were, so to speak, only incidental 
Americans. These two elements of discord were 
always threatening our national existence. As 
regards real unity, therefore, the separation of 
these ten States is rather a gain than a loss. It is 
not the destruction of the body politic, but the 
amputation of a diseased and troublesome limb. 
It is not the bankruptcy of the estate^ but the 
alienation of a property mortgaged above its 
value. 

As to acknowledging the principle of secession, 
I cannot see that we should do so in the least. If 
the Irish should ever succeed in making themselves 
too troublesome for England to hold, would she, 
by conceding their independence, adopt the Romish 
faith ? Did she become a republic, when she ac- 
knowledged our independence? Had we allowed 
the conspiracy to take its own course, that would 



19 



have been legalizing secession; but the very fact 
of war shows that the movement is an insurrection, 
and our utmost admission will be that the insur- 
rection has been partially successful. Nay, the 
Carolinians themselves, when they fired upon 
Sumter, renounced their absurd theory of peaceful 
secession, and confessed that they were seeking a 
pro-slavery revolution. 

The third objection (to which many would pro- 
bably give the first place, if they dealt truly with 
themselves) is that of external danger, the constant 
risk of invasion from a slave-iiolding empire on 
our borders. 

I have no intention of slurring over this objec- 
tion, or trying to shut my eyes to its very formid- 
able appearance. It may be admitted that, while 
the ruling class at the South are only fit for war 
and political intrigue, the ignorant masses are fit 
for nothing but war. They have no aptitude for 
manufactures, or any branch of peaceful industry. 
To prevent them from thinking of their own rights 
and wrongs, and becoming too troublesome to their 
rulers, those rulers must impel them into war. 
Fulfilling the oft-repeated promise of re-establish- 
ing the African slave trade, might, indeed, tem- 
porarily pacify the " mean whites ;" but fearful as 
the hypocrisy of England and France has been, 
we can hardly expect so monstrous a tergiversation 
of principle, as their acquiescence in this measure. 
To war, then. Dictator Davis must go, just as 
Louis Napoleon is compelled to war every three 
years, to sustain his bayonet-propped throne. The 
sight of our prosperity, naturally taking a great 
start with the return of peace, would whet the hate 
of theConfederates. Nor is it impossible that the 



20 

Western Europeans, from sheer antipathy to us, 
might again indirectly assist the Southerners. The 
hypocrisy of a Russell might then, as now, find some 
pretext for declaring that " the North was fighting 
for empire, and the South for independence ;" and 
the French Emperor, who bags large slices of his 
neighbor's territory, under the plea of " rectifying 
his frontier," would applaud a similar rascality in 
his western imitator. Thus, our peace would be 
only an armed truce, and we should be obliged to 
continue our military and naval array, for fear of 
invasion. 

In stating the argument thus, no one can accuse 
me of having understated it. 

To answer it, I might take high ground. I 
might say that, in any event, we must keep up a 
large army and navy for some time to come ; that 
if the Cotton States are subjugated, we must have 
a large force to keep them quiet ; that even in the 
improbable case of their being not only subdued 
but pacified, the threatening attitude of foreign 
nations would not allow us to go back to our old 
condition ; that 200,000 men may amply suffice for 
an army of defence, when thrice that number 
would not be enough for an army of occupation ; 
that the late rising in Pennsylvania shows what 
little chance of success an invader would have ; 
finally, that to persevere in a bloody and expensive 
war, lest we may hereafter be threatened with one 
less bloody and expensive, is like a man committ- 
ing suicide for fear of death. 

But while believing all this to be perfectly true, 
I consider that there is another line of argument 
more eff'ectual. Had we acceded to tlie demands 
of the Confederates without a fight (as our disin- 



21 



terested European friends advised), there would 
have been a likelihood, amounting to a certainty, of 
their invading us. The foreign bankers who had 
speculated in Confederate stock, would have urged 
them to it. Our own cowardice would have 
tempted them. Did we, after any amount of fight- 
ing, yield to their terms, the danger of invasion 
would be very great. But under the circumstances 
of a separation granted by ourselves, this danger 
will be so far diminished as to become, I do not 
say inappreciable, but certainly far from serious. 

How far the resources of the Southerners are ex- 
hausted, is a question ; but of this we may be cer- 
tain, that they have sustained serious losses, both 
of life and property, and would be very glad of 
an opportunity to repose and recruit awhile. The 
transition from war to peace prices would be a 
pleasing novelty. Their newly-formed nationality 
would tickle their vanity and amuse their fancy. 
The fatigue of the recent contest, the enjoyment of 
the present peace, would keep them quiet for some 
years. And while it would be the policy of their 
governors to engage them in war again at the 
earliest possible moment, as the readiest means of 
preventing political and social dissensions, still it 
is very possible that these dissensions mignt get 
the start of the government, and the loosely con- 
nected machine might well fall to pieces before its 
energies could be directed against us. 

But further ; allowing that the rapacity and fe- 
rocity of the Confederates will naturally lead them 
into war after the necessary interval of repose, 
and admitting that Davis may have succeeded du- 
ring that interval in consolidating his loose Con- 
federation into an Empire, is it certain, or even 



22 



probable, that we should be the first object of 
attack ? The Southerners have received some 
hard rubs in this conflict. " Apostolic blows and 
knocks" have taught them that one " chivalry" is 
not necessarily equal to five " mudsills." Besides, 
Davis, though a tremendous scoundrel, is no fool, 
except in the sense in which every wicked man is 
a fool. Whatever his ideas may have been at 
first, he has by this time pretty well taken the 
measure of his power, and understands what he 
can not do. (It would be well were all our people 
as wise). His known reluctance to acquiesce in 
the attempt at northern invasion is a clear proof 
of this. We may reasonably conclude then, that 
the first display of his aggressive cupidity will be 
in another direction. It will seek lands at the 
same time more fertile and less defended. The 
"golden circle" hopelessly shorn of its northern 
segment, will try to extend itself Southward. 
Mexico or the West Indies will be attacked. 

This brings us to a fourth objection, that we 
should be conniving at a crime against humanity 
if we allowed the establishment of this fillibuster- 
ing and slave-extending empire. 

This may be briefly disposed of. We are not 
bound to look after the whole world's interests. 
See the sacrifices we have made to liberty and 
humanity in this war, and the thanks we have had 
from Europe ! We shall have done our share in 
freeing the Border States, and any annoyance or 
injury which England or Erance may receive from 
i\\Q\Y proteges will be a just retribution for their 
present conduct towards us. It will then be our 
turn to look on and laugh. What a delightful 
spectacle to all honest men if Louis Napoleon and 



23 



Jefferson Davis, the representatives of falsehood 
and perfidy, treason and conspiracy on both sides 
of the Atlantic, should go to loggerheads about 
Mexico or some other coveted country I 

The next objection is one of expense and 
trouble, rather than principle or safety. It is 
said, we should have an immense line of Southern 
frontier to protect, over all of which the South- 
erners would smuggle imported goods for the sake 
of ruining our manufactories. 

I cannot but regard this danger as greatly ex- 
aggerated. We have a long line of Northern 
fro'iitier, yet smuggling from Canada has never as- 
sumed the proportions of a serious evil. And if 
we are enabled to disband 400,000 soldiers, we 
can afford to support a goodly number of custom 
house guards. It might also be suggested that our 
present tariff', however useful as a temporary 
measure, has not such intrinsic value that it ought 
to be regarded as a "possession forever." 

Lastly, it may be asked, are the Confederates to 
carry off the vast amount of plunder, public and 
private, which they seized at the commence- 
ment of hostilities? This being a pecuniary 
question, might be settled as such questions fre- 
quently are, by compromise ; for instance, they 
midit 'be allowed to retain their public stealings 
on'condition of refunding their private confisca- 
tions. 

After all, there remains one great practical 
question. Will the Confederates accept these 
terms when offered ? Certainly, to expect that a 
Confederate will entertain any just or reasonable 
proposition requires a sanguine temperament. 
Something might depend on the advic- of their 



24 

foreign backers, yet, after weighing all the chances 
on both sides, and duly considering the arrogance 
of the Southern leaders, the ignorance of the South- 
ern masses, and the obstinacy of both, I must ad- 
mit that there is a probability against their accept- 
ance of our terms. In that case our course would 
be plain. Waging the war in a more limited area, 
and with a more definite view, we should have a 
greater chance of bringing it to a successful and 
speedy termination. Abandoning all the territory 
of the Southern States, except the posts necessary 
as^ material guarantees (which should be strongly 
reinforced), and leaving Kentucky and Missouri to 
take care of tliemselves for awhile, we should direct 
every man and gunboat against Richmond, ard at- 
tack it on all sides with a force of at least 400,000 
men, seizing all property, and freeing all slaves as 
they advance. That nest of traitors once destroyed, 
the enemy having lost the main object for which 
they were fighting, would soon come to terms. 

Even then we should have to guard against a 
final danger. Like other semi-barbarians, these 
men are more formidable in intrigue than in war. 
They might open negotiations in the hope of play- 
ing us some trick. It would, therefore, be neces- 
sary not to relax the vigilance of our blockade or 
the continuance of our military preparations till 
everything was settled. 

Lenox, Mass., Sept. 23, 1862. 









iV^ 






-^v* 














r^^ 
^9^ 






• •• 



.4: 






.^^^v^^'.-e,. 



• • • 



• •• 



vW 



i « ^ 



^^ f£M^^^ "^-^.r^^ 









'•• * 






o • I 















''^o^ 






kP'?!:, 






l> . t • 



■ • 



















^ * • ■ • • a^^ 













^ 'It.. •" 








. >•"> 



